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OPTIMAL SOLID WASTE TAX POLICY WITH 
CENTRALIZED RECYCLING 
Thomas C. Kinnaman
Economic models have demonstrated the effi ciency of curbside collection taxes. This 
paper demonstrates that such effi ciencies disappear in economies with centralized 
recycling options — where recyclable materials can be removed from the waste 
stream either by households or at a centralized recycling facility. In such economies, 
a curbside garbage tax not only fails to encourage the centralized recycler to inter-
nalize the external costs of waste disposal, but introduces ineffi ciencies to the cost-
minimizing mix of household and centralized recycling efforts. The optimal waste 
policy is a tax assessed further downstream at the landfi ll rather than at the curb.
Keywords: environmental taxation, solid waste policy
JEL Codes: H2, H7, Q5
I. INTRODUCTION
Incentive-based environmental policies such as tradable permits and pollution taxes have grown in prominence over the past 25 years. Legislation to reduce lead in gaso-
line, to phase out CFC’s, to reduce sulfur oxides, and most recently to reduce carbon 
dioxide in Europe have all featured tradable permits. Although certain carbon emission 
taxes have been enacted in British Columbia, France, and Scandinavia, curbside taxes 
on the collection of residential solid waste are perhaps the most common application of 
emission taxes. Curbside taxes have been implemented in 4,000 municipalities in the 
United States1 and are also widespread in Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Italy, 
The Netherlands, and Luxembourg. South Korea requires all of its municipalities to 
assess curbside fees for waste collection.
Based on effi ciency arguments, economists have generally supported the implemen-
tation of such curbside taxes for households to internalize all costs of disposing their 
waste (Repetto et al., 1992; Miranda et al., 1994; Porter, 2002). Such fees encourage 
Thomas C. Kinnaman: Department of Economics, Bucknell University, Lewisburg, PA, USA (kinnaman@
bucknell.edu)
 1 See “Unit-Based Pricing in the United States: A Tally of Communities.” United States Environmental 
Protection Agency, http://www.epa.gov/waste/conserve/tools/payt/states/comminfo.htm.
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households to recycle optimally and thus reduce waste effi ciently without facing 
behavioral mandates. Residential waste has been estimated to decrease by two to15 
pounds-per-household per week in response to a curbside tax of $1 per 30-gallon can.2 
Possible increases in illegal dumping (Fullerton and Kinnaman, 1995; Kim, Chang and 
Kelleher, 2008) and the high administrative costs of assessing curbside taxes (Kinna-
man, 2006) are potential drawbacks of curbside taxation.
This paper suggests a third possible problem with curbside waste taxes. Such taxes 
are found to introduce two ineffi ciencies in an economy endowed with technologies to 
separate recyclable materials from the general waste stream at a centralized separat-
ing facility. First, curbside taxes distort the cost-minimizing mix of recycling efforts 
between individual households and centralized facilities. Second, curbside taxes do 
not create price incentives for centralized recycling facilities to internalize the exter-
nal costs of waste disposal. The previous literature assumed that only households 
possessed technologies for separating recyclable materials from the mixed waste 
stream.
The model below will demonstrate that the optimal policy in an economy with 
centralized recycling options is a tax assessed not at the curb but further down the 
waste stream at the landfi ll. The landfi ll tax encourage centralized recyclers to make 
effi cient decisions regarding the amount to remove from the waste stream and allows 
for vertical equality of marginal costs between household and centralized recycling 
efforts. The other advantage of the landfi ll tax, as is the case with the curbside tax 
in economies without centralized recycling, is the elimination of all other policies 
designed to alter household disposal decisions such as mandatory recycling laws, 
deposit-refund systems, and banning materials from landfi lls. One tax does the 
job.
Centralized recycling technologies are utilized in many parts of the developed 
world, especially in Japan and portions of northern Europe and the United States. 
Labor-intensive versions of a centralized recycling system feature workers extracting 
recyclable materials by hand from a slow moving conveyor belt. Capital intensive ver-
sions include the use of magnets to extract ferrous metals, air classifi ers with blowers 
to separate light plastics, and eddy-current separators with magnets to push aluminum 
into separation bins. According to a national survey of randomly selected municipal 
recycling programs conducted in 1997 and described in Folz (1999), roughly 44 percent 
of municipalities in the sample separate recyclable materials in centralized facilities. 
These municipalities recycle an average of 18.6 percent of their waste materials, slightly 
higher than the 15.5 percent recycling rate reported by municipalities without centralized 
recycling facilities. As labor costs rise and separation technologies improve, the portion 
of household materials separated for recycling at centralized facilities may increase in the 
future.
Sections II and III of this paper present the economic model of the waste market with 
and without centralized recycling. Section IV discusses the empirical implications of 
the model, and is followed by a short conclusion.
 2 Kinnaman (2006) and the references therein summarize the empirical estimates. For perspective, the aver-
age household generates roughly 50 pounds of waste per week in the absence of curbside taxation.
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II. NO CENTRALIZED RECYCLING 
To introduce notation and characterize prior results, this section develops a model 
where only households possess recycling technologies as a centralized recycling 
option does not exist. Assume a representative household gains utility (u) from its own 
consumption of a composite commodity good (c) and experiences disutility from the 
aggregate quantity of disposed waste (D),
(1) u = u(c, D), where uc > 0 and uD < 0. 
Each unit of consumption (c) generates one unit of waste. Each unit of waste can 
either be separated by the household for curbside recycling collection (r) or remain in 
a mixed state (m) for collection and disposal in a landfi ll. Thus, 
(2) c = r + m.
Separating waste materials for recycling requires the employment of a household 
resource such as labor (kh) according to the household recycling production function r = 
σ (kh), where σ ′ > 0 and σ ″ < 0. This function can be inverted to explicitly solve for kh
(3) kh = h(r), where hʹ > 0 and hʺ > 0. 
A representative waste collection fi rm employs labor to remove separated waste (requir-
ing kr) and mixed waste (requiring km) according to the inverted production functions3
(4a) kr = r(r), where rʹ > 0 and rʺ > 0
(4b) km = m (m), where mʹ > 0 and mʺ > 0.
A representative production fi rm uses labor (kc) and recycled waste materials (r) to 
produce the composite commodity good according to the production function
(5) c = f(kc, r), where, fk > 0, fr > 0, fkk < 0, and frr < 0.
In this version of the model, all mixed waste collected from households is disposed 
at a landfi ll (d), thus m = d. The landfi ll uses labor in the disposal process.
(6) kd = d(d), where d′ > 0 and d″ > 0.
The aggregate quantity of waste is D = nd, where n is the number of representative 
households in the economy. Labor is fully employed at a fi xed kˉ (thus assuming no 
choice over labor and leisure ), thus
(7) kˉ = kh + kr + km + kc + kd.
 3 These production functions could involve either a constant or decreasing marginal product of labor to 
achieve the market equilibriums discussed below.
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A. Social Planner
A social planner maximizes household utility (1) subject to constraints (2) through 
(7), m = d, and D = nd. Upon substitution, the planner chooses the quantity of separated 
household waste (r) and disposed waste (d) to maximize
L = u(r + d, nd) + λ{ f [kˉ – h(r) – r(r) – m(d) – d(d), r] – r – d},
where λ is the marginal utility of increasing the production of the composite commodity 
good. The fi rst-order conditions are4
(8a) Lr: uc /λ = fkh′ + fkr′ – fr + 1
(8b) Ld: uc /λ = fkm′ + fkd′ + 1 – nuD /λ.
Setting these two conditions equal to each other and simplifying implies the socially 
optimal allocation of waste and recycling can be characterized by the marginal condition
(9) m′ + d′ – nuD /λ fk = h′ + r′ – fr / fk.
Optimality requires the full social marginal cost of waste disposal to be equal to the 
full social marginal cost of recycling. The full social marginal cost of waste disposal is 
comprised of the marginal cost to collect the waste (m′), the marginal cost to dispose 
of the waste (d′), and the household disutility experienced from all disposed waste 
(measured in units of labor per unit of waste disposal). The marginal cost of recycling 
is comprised of the marginal cost for the household to separate the waste (h′) plus the 
marginal cost to the waste company to collect the separated material (r′) less the produc-
tive benefi t of the recycled material in producing the composite commodity good. The 
next section explores the conditions necessary for a decentralized economy to obtain 
this social optimum.
B. Decentralized Competitive Economy
Assume both a curbside disposal tax (tm) and landfi ll tax (td) are available to social 
planners to enable waste generators to internalize the social costs of disposal. Each 
representative household in a decentralized market economy maximizes its own utility 
(1) subject to the materials balance constraint (2), the household separating production 
function (3) and the budget constraint.
(kˉ – kh)w + prr = c + ( pm + tm)m.
 4 A unique solution is assumed to be internal and second-order conditions are assumed to hold (Baumol and 
Oates, 1988).
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The household earns income from allocating its endowment of labor (less that used to 
separate recyclable materials) to the labor market in exchange for wage w and revenue 
earned from the curbside collection of their separated recycled materials ( pr, which can 
be negative if separated materials have no economic value to producers of the composite 
good). The household spends this income on the composite good (the numeraire good 
with price pc = 1 per unit) and for the collection of mixed waste ( pm per unit plus the 
curbside disposal tax tm).
Because n is large, each representative household does not internalize the externality 
associated with its own waste generation, and instead considers D to be exogenously 
determined. The household chooses the quantity of their waste to separate for recycling 
(r) and the quantity to remain mixed (m) to maximize
L = u(r + m, D) + δ [wkˉ – wh(r) + prr – (r + m) – ( pm + tm)m] ,
where δ is the marginal utility of household income. The fi rst-order conditions are
Lr: uc /δ = wh′ – pr + 1
Lm: uc /δ = 1 + pm + tm.
Combining these, the household maximizes utility by satisfying the marginal condition
(10) wh′ = pr + pm+ tm.
The household devotes resources to recycling until the marginal opportunity cost (wh′) 
is equal to the marginal benefi t — the price received for separated materials plus the 
after tax savings from not disposing those materials as waste.
A waste collection fi rm earns revenue from collecting mixed waste from households 
(at pm per unit) and from selling separated materials to the producers of the composite 
good (at price ps). Costs are comprised of payments to households for collecting sepa-
rated recycled materials ( pr, which once again can be negative), payment to landfi lls 
for waste disposal (at pd per unit disposed), and costs to employ labor to collect both 
separated and mixed wastes at the curb
π = pmm + psr – prr – pdm – wr(r) – wm(m).
Profi t is maximized by choosing the amount of mixed waste (m) and recycled waste 
(r) to collect subject to the production functions (4a) and (4b), and the constraint that m 
= d (all collected mixed waste is disposed at the landfi ll). The fi rst-order conditions are
(11a) πm: wm′ = pm – pd
(11b) πr: wr′ = ps – pr.
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The collector chooses quantities such that the marginal cost of collecting mixed and 
separated waste equal their respective marginal benefi ts.
The producer of the composite commodity good earns revenue from the sale of the 
numeraire composite good (c with price equal to 1), pays w for each unit of labor (kc), 
and pays the collector for separated recyclable materials ( ps). It maximizes profi t
π = c – wkc – psr
subject to the production function (5) by setting fk = w and fr = ps. Combining these 
conditions yields 
(12) fk / w = fr /ps.
Profi t is maximized by choosing inputs such that the ratios of the marginal product and 
the marginal cost of each input are equal.
Finally, the landfi ll operator chooses the quantity of mixed waste (m = d) to accept 
for disposal to maximize profi t
π = ( pd – td)d – wk
d,
subject to the production function (6). The waste disposal fi rm pays a tax on each unit 
of waste accepted for disposal (td). Profi t is maximized when
(13) wd′ = pd – td.
Substituting (11a) and (11b) into (10) to eliminate pm and pr and then substituting 
(12) and (13) into the resulting equation to eliminate ps and pd yields
(14) m′ + d′ + (tm /w + td /w) = h′ + r′ – fr /fk.
The social optimum can be achieved in the decentralized economy by setting the gar-
bage collection tax (tm) and/or the landfi ll tax (td) such that (14) is identical to (9). The 
optimal tax policy, upon substituting fk = w from the producer’s profi t-maximization 
problem above satisfi es the condition 
(15) t*m + t
*
d = – nuD /λ.
A tax of –nuD /λ can be assessed at the curb (tm > 0, td = 0), at the landfi ll (tm = 0, 
td > 0), or any linear combination of the two taxes such that (15) is satisfi ed. If adminis-
trative costs are associated with implementing either tax, then the optimal policy would 
involve selecting the single tax (tm or td) that involves the fewest administrative costs. 
Because the number of households far exceeds the number of landfi lls, administrative 
costs may be lower for the landfi ll tax than the curbside tax. Otherwise, there is nothing 
in the model to support favoring one tax approach over the other.
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Controlling for changes in notation and a few other details of this model, the curbside 
tax rate (tm > 0, td = 0) is similar to optimal tax rates found in the existing literature — a 
literature that does not consider landfi ll taxation.5 The magnitude of the optimal tax 
increases with the magnitude of the externality (nuD, which is negative), and decreases 
with increases in the marginal utility of production (λ).6
III. HOUSEHOLD AND CENTRALIZED SEPARATION OPTIONS
Assume now that the representative waste collecting fi rm employs labor (ks) and a 
technology to separate household waste (m) for recycling at a centralized recycling 
facility (with quantity s) according to the inverted production function
(16) k s = s(s), where s′ > 0 and s″ > 0.
The remainder of the mixed waste is taken to the landfi ll. Thus, instead of m = d, 
we have
(17) m = s + d.
A. Social Optimum
The social planner chooses r, d, and s to maximize utility (1) subject to constraints 
(2) through (7), where (7) now includes ks, the requirement that D = nd, and (16) and 
(17). The Lagrange function is
L = u(r + s + d, nd) + λ{ f [kˉ – h(r) – r(r) – m(s + d) – s(s) – d (d), r + s] – r – s – d},
where λ once again is the marginal utility of producing one additional unit of the com-
posite commodity good. The fi rst-order conditions are
(18a=8a) Lr: uc /λ = fkh′ + fkr′ – fr + 1
(18b=8b) Ld: uc /λ = fkm′ + fkd′ + 1 – nuD/λ
(18c) Ls: uc /λ = fks′ + fkm′ – fr + 1.
The fi rst and second conditions are identical to those above. Combining (18a) and 
(18b) to eliminate uc /λ yields the same marginal condition given in (9) above, which 
 5 This literature includes Miedema (1983), Dobbs (1991), Dinan (1993), Palmer and Walls (1994), Fullerton 
and Kinnaman (1995), and most recently Ferrara (2008). 
 6 This model does not include virgin materials as a substitute in production for recycled materials. Fullerton 
and Kinnaman (1995) demonstrate that the addition of virgin materials to a general equilibrium model 
does not alter the optimal tax rate for waste.
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is restated as (19a) below. Combining (18a) and (18c), and then (18b) and (18c) yields 
two additional conditions for the social optimum
(19a=9) m′ + d′ – nuD /λfk = h′ + r′ – fr /fk 
(19b) h′ + r′ = m′ + s′
(19c) s′ – fr /fk = d′ – nuD /λfk.
As above, optimality condition (19a) equates the full social marginal costs of curbside 
waste disposal and curbside recycling. Condition (19b) equates the full marginal cost 
of household recycling and the full marginal cost of centralized recycling. The former 
is comprised of the marginal cost to the household to separate the waste (h′) plus the 
marginal cost to the waste collector to collect the separated waste (r′). The latter is 
comprised of the marginal cost to the collector to collect mixed waste (m′) plus the 
marginal cost to separate that waste at the centralized recycling facility (s′). The fi nal 
optimality condition (19c) equates the full social marginal cost of recycling the mate-
rial at the centralized facility with the full social marginal cost of disposing the mate-
rial. Centralized recycling incurs a marginal cost (s′) but generates raw materials for 
production (fr /fk). Disposal involves a marginal cost (d′) and a direct loss in household 
utility.
B. Decentralized Competitive Equilibrium
The optimal tax policy now has to satisfy three conditions, rather than just one. Con-
sider once again the two tax policies available to policy makers to allow decentralized 
economic agents to reach the social optimum, a curbside tax on waste collection (tm) 
and a waste tax levied at the landfi ll (td).
The household faces the identical problem as above and therefore maximizes util-
ity according to (10). The household separates waste until the marginal resource cost 
is equal to the curbside (after tax) price of waste plus the price received for recycled 
materials.7 Likewise the profi t maximizing behavior of the fi rm producing the composite 
good is identical to the conditions given in (12) above. The landfi ll also faces the same 
problem as above and maximizes profi t when (13) is satisfi ed.
The waste collector/processor once again earns revenue from selling recycled materials 
(at price ps) to the representative producer. But the recycled materials are now separated 
either by the household (r) or the centralized recycling facility (s), and are assumed 
to be perfect substitutes in the production of the composite good. As above, the waste 
 7 Notice private waste haulers may choose to charge households a positive market per-bag price at the curb 
for waste collection if pm > 0. The implication of the private decision to charge a monthly fee ( pm = 0) or 
a per-bag fee ( pm > 0) on effi cient outcomes is discussed in the next section below.
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collector/processor earns revenue from collecting mixed waste from the household 
( pm), pays pr to the household for separated waste (r), pays the landfi ll pd to dispose 
non-separated waste (d), and pays w for labor to collect mixed waste (km), to collect 
separated waste (kr) and now to separate waste at the centralized recycling facility (kp). 
The waste collector’s problem is to maximize profi t 
π = ps(r + s) + pm(d + s) – prr – pdd – wr(r) – wm(d + s) – ws(s),
where m = d + s. The fi rst order conditions are now
(20a=11a) πd: wm′ = pm – pd 
(20b=11b) πr: wr′ = ps – pr
(20c) πs: wm′ + ws′ = ps + pm.
The fi rst two of these conditions are identical to the profi t-maximizing conditions 
above. The third condition suggests the collector/processor separates mixed waste (m) 
and the centralized recycling facility such that the marginal cost (wm′ to collect the 
mixed waste plus ws′ to separate the mixed waste) is equal to the marginal revenue (the 
price paid by producers for the separated materials plus the price paid by household to 
collect mixed waste).
The decentralized equilibrium is completely represented by (10), (12), (13), and 
(20a-20c). Upon substitution, this system of six equations is reduced to 
(21a) wh′ + wr′ = pm + wfr /fk + tm
(21b) wm′ + wd′ = pm – td
(21c) wm′ + ws′ = pm + wfr /fk
 .
Combining fi rst (21a) and (21b), then (21a) and (21c) and fi nally (21b) and (21c) to 
eliminate pm yields the three conditions
(22a) m′ + d′ + td /w + tm/w = h′ + r′ – fr /fk 
(22b) h′ + r′ = m′ + s′+ tm /w
(22c) s′ – fr /fk = d′ + td /w.
The social optimum is achieved when these three conditions are equivalent to (19a), 
(19b), and (19c). Two tax instruments, tm and td, are once again available.
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C. The Landfi ll Tax (td > 0, tm = 0)
Consider a tax levied not at the curb, but at the landfi ll. The single landfi ll tax can 
achieve all three of the optimal marginal conditions defi ned above. To see this, fi rst 
compare (19a) and (22a). The optimal tax is
(23) t*d = –nuD / λ ,
which is the same tax rate assessed at the landfi ll in an economy without centralized 
recycling technology (in Section II above). Even though the household does not explicitly 
pay a curbside tax, the optimal landfi ll tax may cause the collector/processor to increase 
the curbside price of waste collection, a decision examined in Section IV below.
Next, compare (19b) and (22b) and note that the decentralized equilibrium satisfi es 
the optimality condition. The landfi ll tax does not appear in this condition, and thus a 
positive landfi ll tax does not distort the waste collector/processor’s effi cient decision 
between collecting separated waste from households and separating the waste them-
selves. This decision is instead governed in a decentralized economy by the marginal 
costs of each option.
Finally, compare (19c) and (22c) and note that the tax necessary to achieve optimal 
condition (22c) is once again the optimal tax rate given in (23). A single landfi ll tax 
encourages both the optimal recycle/landfi ll decisions by collector/processors and 
optimal separating decisions by households. The landfi ll tax causes waste collecting/
processing fi rms to internalize the social costs of landfi ll disposal while at the same 
time causing those fi rms to increase the price of collecting non-separated waste from 
households. 
D. The Curbside Waste Tax (tm > 0, td = 0)
Recall that the existing economic literature suggests a curbside waste tax (tm ) allows 
a decentralized economy to achieve the effi cient allocation of resources when illegal 
dumping is not a factor. The optimal curbside tax of t*m = –nuD /λ is necessary for (22a) 
to equal (19a). The waste-producing household internalizes the waste externality and 
accordingly chooses the optimal quantities of mixed and separated waste.
But the social optimum condition (19b) can only be satisfi ed when tm  = 0. Profi t 
maximizing collectors/recyclers choose between household and centralized separation 
methods and reach equilibrium when the marginal costs of both options are equal. A 
positive curbside tax distorts this equilibrium and causes households to ineffi ciently 
separate waste that could be separated at the processing facility at lower cost. In the 
long run, the curbside tax could delay the natural development of a centralized recycling 
industry because the tax reduces the recycled materials available in mixed waste streams.
Once mixed materials have been collected from households, optimality condition 
(19c) implies the marginal cost of separating materials at the centralized facility should 
be equal to the marginal social cost of disposal. A curbside waste tax is powerless to 
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internalize disposal costs to centralized recyclers (it does not appear in (22c)), and 
therefore a policy approach relying only on curbside taxes yields too little centralized 
recycling and too much disposal. 
To summarize, although the curbside waste tax induces households to make effi cient 
waste disposal decisions, two ineffi ciencies are introduced with centralized recycling. 
First, curbside taxes unnecessarily distort the process of material separation in favor 
of households over centralized recyclers. Second, curbside taxes are too far upstream 
to internalize the social costs of disposal for centralized recycling fi rms.
E. Both Tax Policies (tm > 0, td > 0)
Recall in Section II above that any linear combination of the two available tax poli-
cies satisfying (15) leads to the effi cient quantities of waste and recycling. This result 
does not carry through to the case of centralized recycling. The curbside tax (tm) must 
be zero for the full marginal cost of household recycling to equal the full marginal cost 
of centralized recycling. Furthermore the landfi ll tax (td) must alone equal the left hand 
side of (15) to equate the full social marginal cost of recycling the material at the central-
ized facility with the full social marginal cost of disposing the material. Curbside taxes 
must therefore be zero and landfi ll taxes set equal to the full external costs of waste in 
economies with centralized recycling technologies.
IV. EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL
The optimal tax rate on waste disposed at the landfi ll as modeled above is equal to 
the external marginal cost of waste collection and disposal (–nuD /λ). External costs of 
waste collection include road congestion and the increased likelihood of vehicle acci-
dents from waste trucks. Waste disposed in landfi lls can cause odor and unsightliness, 
threaten local ground water supplies, and contribute to climate change by emitting 
methane. Incinerators also release climate change gases, diminish local air quality, and 
generate hazardous ashes.
A few economic papers have estimated these external costs. Dijkgraaf and Vol-
lebergh (2004), for example, estimate that external costs are $4.87 per ton for landfi ll 
disposal and $20.58 per ton for incineration.8 Kinnaman (2006) estimates external costs 
at $5.76–$9.38 per ton of waste disposed at landfi lls, where the higher value pertains 
to remote rural landfi lls that require lengthy transportation routes and to landfi lls that 
do not capture methane for electricity production. Isely and Lowen (2007) estimate 
external costs at $5.48 per ton for landfi ll disposal. Of these three, only the Kinnaman 
(2006) estimate includes the external costs of waste transportation — estimated at 58 
cents to $1.93 per ton (Davies and Doble, 2004). Based upon these three estimates, the 
optimal landfi ll tax appears to fall in the $5–10 per ton range. The optimal incineration 
tax could be over $20 per ton.
 8 All estimated external costs cited in this paragraph have been adjusted to 2010 dollars.
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Landfi ll taxes are common in many parts of the developed world. In the United 
States, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976 allocated to the 
individual states the authority to regulate solid waste. Twenty states have implemented 
landfi ll taxes ranging from 25 cents per ton in Hawaii to $8 per ton in New Jersey (Kin-
naman, 2006). Landfi ll taxes in the United States average $2.22 per ton — a bit lower 
than the estimated external marginal costs of waste collection and disposal cited above. 
Internationally, the United Kingdom, The Netherlands, France, and Sweden have also 
implemented landfi ll taxes.
Recall that the landfi ll or incineration tax, if set at an effi cient level, internalizes all 
costs of disposal, and all other policies designated to promote recycling or discourage 
waste are unnecessary and produce ineffi ciencies. In virtually all cases of existing landfi ll 
taxes, both internationally and in the United States, governments have also imposed an 
assortment of other policies such as mandatory recycling ordinances, required recycled 
content standards in production, an assortment of subsidies to promote recycling, pro-
ducer responsibility laws, and deposit-refund schemes. These additional policy measures 
are unnecessary if landfi ll taxes are set effi ciently.
To advocates of curbside waste pricing, an interesting empirical question is whether 
or not the implementation of a landfi ll tax will affect a local garbage collector’s curbside 
pricing strategy. Two broad pricing options are available. First, a collector can charge 
households a fl at fee for unlimited use of its waste collection services. Under this pricing 
scheme, the marginal cost to the household of contributing an additional unit of waste 
is zero ( pm = 0). Or the collector can instead measure the household’s waste and charge 
according to the weight or volume ( pm > 0). The profi t-maximizing waste collector selects 
unit pricing over the fl at fee only if the private benefi ts of doing so exceed the private costs.
The private benefi ts of employing unit pricing ( pm > 0) are illustrated in Figure 1, 
where the quantity of mixed waste collected is measured along the horizontal axis. 
Household demand for collection services is derived from the consumption it supports, 
and is labeled D in Figure 1. The private marginal cost (PMC) of waste collection and 
disposal is, by the assumptions of the model above, equal to w(w′ + d′). Because of 
assumed diminishing marginal returns in these two production processes, both m′ and d′ 
increase with the quantity of waste collected. Households generate m0 units in response 
to a fi xed monthly fee ( pm = 0). The market-equilibrium curbside price of p1 reduces 
the quantity of waste generated by households from m0 to m1. The private benefi t to the 
waste collector/processor from charging this price is illustrated by area A in Figure 1.
But to capture these benefi ts, collection/processor fi rms must develop a technology to 
monitor each household’s unique waste contribution. Options could include universal 
product codes on waste containers, fi tting scales on garbage trucks to weigh garbage, or 
issuing special bags, stickers, or tags to each household. Collectors must also take the 
time to monitor each household’s waste contribution, and in some cases individualized 
bills must be sent to each customer. Assume the administrative cost of these efforts is 
TC. The profi t-maximizing waste collector will adopt unit pricing only if A > TC. The 
outcome of this condition could vary across municipalities.
The implementation of the optimal landfi ll tax increases the private marginal cost of 
waste collection and disposal. The optimal price for waste collection increases from p1 
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to p2, household waste generation decreases from m1 to m2, and the benefi ts of imple-
menting unit pricing to the collector increase from area A to area A + B. The landfi ll tax 
will encourage the collector/processor to implement curbside pricing if A + B > TC > A. 
Fixed monthly fees will be levied under a landfi ll tax if A + B < TC. Because the collec-
tor/processor paying the landfi ll tax internalizes all social benefi ts and administrative 
costs of each pricing strategy, its profi t-maximizing decisions will be effi cient. The lack 
of a curbside price is not evidence of ineffi cient pricing policies or of market failure.
The empirical economics literature has estimated this effect — how an increase in 
landfi ll disposal costs (tipping fees) affect the likelihood of adopting curbside pricing 
strategies. Kinnaman and Fullerton (2000) estimate that a $1 per ton increase in land-
fi ll disposal costs increases the probability a local waste collector implements per-bag 
pricing by only 0.78 percent. Extrapolating from those results, a $10 increase in landfi ll 
disposal fees (the upper bound of the estimates of external marginal cost of waste col-
lection and disposal) increases the likelihood of per-bag pricing by 7.8 percent. Among 
those localities that have implemented per-bag pricing, Kinnaman and Fullerton (2000) 
fi nd a $1 increase in landfi ll disposal costs increases the curbside fee by 3.5 cents per 
bag — suggesting a $10 increase would increase curbside fees by 35 cents per bag. 
Tawil (1995) also estimates the probability of adopting curbside pricing increases with 
economic variables such as disposal fees.9
P1 
P2 
A 
B 
m0 m1 m2 
PMC = w(mʹ+dʹ) 
SMC = w(mʹ+dʹ) + td* 
D 
Mixed Waste (m) 
$/unit 
Figure 1
The Total Benefi ts of Curbside Pricing
 9 In a related question, Kinnaman (2006) fi nds no empirical relationship between the landfi ll cost of disposal 
and the likelihood that local collectors offer curbside recycling to households.
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A fi nal empirical question is the effect of a positive curbside price on household 
disposal behavior. In response to a curbside price of $1 per 30-gallon bag, existing 
estimates suggest that households reduce garbage by between one to 10 pounds per 
week — roughly 2–20 percent of a household’s waste (Kinnaman, 2006). Fullerton 
and Kinnaman (1996) estimate that 28 percent of the reduction of garbage observed 
at the curb from the implementation of curbside pricing may be redirected to illicit or 
illegal forms of disposal.
V. CONCLUSION
The states of Wisconsin and Washington require their municipalities to imple-
ment curbside taxes, and internationally South Korea requires all municipalities to 
implement curbside taxes. The model presented in this paper suggests landfi ll and 
incineration taxes should replace such local curbside taxes when centralized recycling 
technologies are available. Where centralized recycling technologies do not exist, 
the landfi ll tax preserves the effi ciency properties of the curbside tax and removes a 
barrier to the eventual emergence of centralized recycling facilities. Local waste col-
lectors may choose to price garbage at the curb if the benefi ts of doing so exceed the 
costs.
The conclusions of the model can easily be extended to demonstrate that other solid 
waste policies directed at households are also ineffi cient with centralized recycling tech-
nologies. For example, much of the economics literature on optimal waste policy cited 
above advocates deposit-refund programs where households face opportunities for illegal 
dumping. As is the case with the curbside tax, the effi ciency of deposit-refund programs 
where refunds for recyclable materials are paid directly to households is preserved only 
in economies with no centralized recycling technologies.  With centralized recycling 
programs, refunds must be paid to centralized recyclers to avoid the two ineffi ciencies 
discussed above. Centralized recyclers internalize the social costs of disposal with the 
recycling refund and the optimal allocation of separation efforts between households 
and centralized recyclers is preserved.
Finally, many municipalities, both internationally and in the United States, collect 
household mixed waste and separated recyclable materials using public municipal 
resources. In principle, the landfi ll tax causes public agencies to internalize the social 
costs of landfi ll disposal as described above. However, the likelihood that the landfi ll 
tax would lead to optimal curbside pricing following the logic of Figure 1 would be 
reduced if the public agency pursues goals other than cost minimization.
REFERENCES
Baumol, William J., and Wallace. E. Oates, 1988. The Theory of Environmental Policy. Cambridge 
University Press, New York, NY.
Davies, Bob, and Michael Doble, 2004. “The Development and Implementation of a Landfi ll 
Tax in the UK.” In Addressing the Economics of Waste, 63–80. OECD, Paris.
Optimal Solid Waste Tax Policy with Centralized Recycling 251
Dijkgraaf, Elbert, and Herman R. J. Vollebergh, 2004. “Burn or Bury? A Social Cost Comparison 
of Final Waste Disposal Methods.” Ecological Economics 50 (3 and 4), 233–247. 
Dinan, Terry M., 1993. “Economic Effi ciency Effects of Alternative Policies for Reducing Waste 
Disposal.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 25 (3), 242–256.
Dobbs, Ian M., 1991. “Litter and Waste Management: Disposal Taxes Versus User Charges.” 
Canadian Journal of Economics 24 (1), 221–227.
Ferrara, Ida, 2008. “Illegal Disposal of Commercial Solid Waste: A Dynamic Analysis.” Atlantic 
Economic Journal 36 (2), 211–232. 
Folz, David H., 1999. “Recycling Policy and Performance: Trends in Participation, Diversion, 
and Costs.” Public Works Management and Policy 4 (2), 131–142.
Fullerton, Don, and Thomas C. Kinnaman, 1995. “Garbage, Recycling, and Illicit Burning or 
Dumping.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 29 (1), 78–91.
Fullerton, Don, and Thomas C. Kinnaman, 1996. “Household Responses to Pricing Garbage by 
the Bag.” American Economic Review 86 (4), 971–984.
Kim, Geum-Soo, Young-Jae Chang, and David Kelleher, 2008. “Unit Pricing of Municipal Solid 
Waste and Illegal Dumping: An Empirical Analysis of Korean Experience.” Environmental 
Economics and Policy Studies 9 (3), 167–176.
Kinnaman, Thomas C., 2006. “Examining the Justifi cation for Residential Recycling.” Journal 
of Economic Perspectives 20 (4), 219–232.
Kinnaman, Thomas C., and Don Fullerton, 2000. “Garbage and Recycling in Communities with 
Curbside Recycling and Unit-Based Pricing.” Journal of Urban Economics 48 (3), 419–442.
Isely, Paul, and Aaron Lowen, 2007. “Price and Substitution in Residential Solid Waste.” Con-
temporary Economic Policy 25 (3), 433–443. 
Miedema, Allen K., 1983. “Fundamental Economic Comparisons of Solid Waste Policy Options.” 
Resources and Energy 5 (1), 21–43.
Miranda, Marie Lynn, Jess W. Everett, Daniel Blume, and Barbeau A. Roy, Jr., 1994. “Market-
Based Incentives and Residential Municipal Solid Waste,” Journal of Policy Analysis and 
Management 13 (4), 681–698.
Palmer, Karen, and Margaret Walls, 1994. “Materials Use and Solid Waste: An Evaluation of 
Policies.” RFF Discussion Paper 95–02. Resources for the Future, Washington, DC.
Porter, Richard C., 2002. The Economics of Waste. Resources for the Future, Washington, DC.
Repetto, Robert, Roger C. Dower, Robin Jenkins, and Jacqueline Geoghegan, 1992. Green Fees: 
How a Tax Shift Can Work for the Environment and the Economy. The World Resources Institute, 
Washington, DC.
Tawil, Natalie, 1995. “On the Political Economy of Municipal Curbside Recycling Programs: 
Evidence from Massachusetts.” Working paper. Congressional Budget Offi ce, Washington, DC. 

